

~~SECRET~~
~~No Foreign Dissem~~

AHIP--1957

By the end of 1957 AHIP had succeeded in:

1. Securing agreement on the use of the ISC as a common classification scheme for the indexing of documents.
2. Adopting a common numbering scheme for documents, which eliminated the confusion of the earlier system of multiple numbering.
3. Obtaining interagency consent to reproduce each other's documents and thus reduce time delays in servicing requests for these materials.
4. Instituting a standard form and procedure for borrowing documents from IAC agency document centers.
5. Forming working groups to investigate the application of machines to information handling problems, the feasibility of developing a common format for IAC information reports, and possible improvement of the document loan system within the community.

25X1A9A

In September AHIP established a Working Group on the (WGISC), ISC, chaired by [] of OCR. This group was

1. To review and clarify the philosophy underlying the common use of the ISC.
2. To determine the extent to which the basic ISC should be recast to meet the general needs of the IAC.
3. To develop a practical plan for specialized user expansion of the ISC beyond the basic structure.
4. To agree to methods for systematic revision, printing and distribution of the basic ISC.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~No Foreign Dissem~~

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

5. To recommend action to AHIP outlining ways and means by which the ISC should be modified.

The WGISC presented its final report to the Chairman, AHIP, on 27 November. It made the following recommendations:

1. That CIA assume responsibility to revise the ISC in accordance with certain principles of common use and instructions spelled out in lengthy attachments to their report.
2. That CIA utilize an outside consultant in hierarchical classification, as necessary, for advice and guidance.
3. That the final version of the ISC be issued before 1 January 1959, under IAC auspices.
4. That the WGISC continue as coordinators and advisers to the CIA staff in charge of the ISC revision.

In October the IAC issued a policy statement designed to facilitate third-agency use of intelligence documents among full-time member agencies whenever the documentation in question had received general dissemination and was free of special classification ~~document~~ restricting distribution and reproduction. In December AHIP issued a Guide to Intel-

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

Establishment of CODIAC

In late 1957 AHIP had proposed that its ad hoc status be terminated and that it be replaced with a standing committee of the IAC, with revised and expanded terms of reference. As a result, under DCID 1/4 (new series) of 1958 21 April, the IAC approved the establishment of the Committee on Documentation (CODIAC). The new DCID broadened the Agency's responsibilities in intelligence documentation and information processing. OCR provided both the Chairman ^{25X1A9A} ~~Bave~~ and the Secretary for CODIAC, as it had for AHIP. ^{25X1A9A}

CODIAC was to be composed of representatives of the IAC agencies, with other ~~agencies of the~~ ^{departments} government invited to participate as appropriate. Its mission was to promote means by which the intelligence community could make optimal use of information of intelligence value however recorded.

The functions of CODIAC were as follows:

1. To recommend policy to the IAC in the field of documentation.
2. To conduct surveys required to support the mission of the committee, subject to agreement by departments and agencies concerned.
3. To coordinate the development of compatible systems for documentation and the processing of information.
4. To review the operation of reference services of common concern.
5. To exchange information within the intelligence community on the solution of documentation problems, including studies, research, contracts, proposed agreements and actions,

SECRET
No Foreign Dissem

The In September 195 , the NSC established the US Intelligence Board (USIB), which replaced the IAC and the USCIB. As a result, the designation of ~~PROGIA~~ CODIAC was changed to CODIB.

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

publications, seminars and demonstrations.

6. To monitor interagency agreements in the field of the committee's responsibility.
7. To assist member agencies in solving problems arising from programs or projects under way and of mutual interest.
8. To coordinate selected documentation activities with foreign intelligence services with which the interchange of information had been authorized by the IAC.
- 2/2/5*

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

1956

25X1

In April, by DDI [redacted] a coordinated Vital

25X1

Materials Program was established in OCR to assist the DDI offices in the fulfillment of their responsibilities for operation in time of emergency. Each office was to be responsible for selecting appropriate materials for use in the event of an emergency. Except for administrative materials, OCR was to be responsible for coordinating, arranging and transferring selected materials to the Vital Materials Repository.

The Vital Materials Officer for OCR was to maintain a complete inventory of all intelligence materials in the DDI Central Collection for review by any interested office. To ensure continued attention to the Vital Materials Program, a Vital Materials Committee was established under OCR chairmanship. This committee was to plan for and coordinate the overall DDI Vital Materials Program; to recommend criteria for selection of intelligence materials by the individual offices for incorporation into the Vital Materials Collection; and to recommend to the DDI and the ADs specific actions for improvement of the Vital Materials Program. [redacted] Executive, OCR, became the first Chairman of the Committee. [redacted]

25X1A9A

25X1A9A

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

25X1A9A

11

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

~~SECRET~~ Inspector General's Report

During the first few months of 1956 three representatives of the Office of the Inspector General--
~~General Scherer, George H. Brown and Herman H. Brown~~ conducted an inspection of OCR during a survey of the ~~the~~ DDI side of the Agency. They reviewed all organizational units and their activities, visited all physical facilities maintained by OCR, and interviewed 176 employees at all grade levels. The IG report submitted to the DCI on 25 April stated that in general the Agency's central reference system, as administered by OCR, was efficient and effective in providing timely response to the needs of the research components of CIA and other members of the US intelligence community.

The inspectors found that OCR was making maximum use of the latest in machine indexing systems and that it was constantly alert to new developments in library technology to increase its support to consumers in terms of timely responsiveness to their reference needs. They also found OCR personnel in all units to be competent and imbued with an excellent spirit of service and support.

The IG team did find, however, that the total reference capabilities of OCR were close to the point of diminishing returns in terms of morale and efficiency. Because there was no prospect of an increase in OCR's T/O authorization, and because space restrictions imposed a limit on expansion, the inspectors stated that it was mandatory that

SECRET

~~SECRET~~ No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

OCR, with the active support of the DDI, conduct a critical appraisal of its ~~total~~ activities and take specific action to ~~conserve~~ ^{conserve} and improve its overall services and support. ⁴To do this, they said, OCR must review its functions and eliminate those that were marginal in terms of consumer needs; increase emphasis on the consolidation and refinement of Agency consumer needs through OCR participation in the planning and programming activities of the DDI, ¹through the inter-departmental reference planning being conducted by AHIP, exert all possible influence to establish the allocation of reference responsibilities on an ~~IAC~~ ^{IAC}wide basis; continue emphasis on ~~the~~ development of new techniques of mechanization (such as Minicard) to reduce document handling and storage and ~~the~~ ^{on} improvement in procedures to promote greater efficiency of operation; and more critically review ~~consumer~~ ^{consumer} requests for the acquisition of books, periodicals and publications to ensure that they were essential and emphasize ^e the use of such material on a loan basis as opposed to outright purchase. These actions, the inspectors noted, were contrary to the philosophy of "service at all costs" that ~~governed~~ ^{governed} the activities of OCR at that time. Nonetheless, they considered them essential in the interests of the continued efficiency of the Agency's ~~present~~ ^{existing} excellent central reference system.

The inspectors made 19 specific recommendations related to the policies, philosophy and concepts governing the operations

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

of OCR as a whole and 19 more concerning deficiencies of a procedural or administrative nature. On behalf of the DDI, the AD/CR then drew up comments on each recommendation indicating agreement or dissent. Action on most of the IG proposals was taken soon after completion of the survey. One, a proposal that the DDI consider transfer and consolidation of the functions and personnel of FDD from OO to OCR as such time as the Agency acquired its new building and physical consolidation could be effected, was finally implemented in 1963.

~~TRANSLATION Research~~
Approved For Release 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000400070008-5

In May 1956 OCR received approval to allocate funds

for research into mechanical translation (MT). CIA interest
in MT research dated back to 1951, when some of its scientists
discussed the possibility of developing an automatic indexing
and translating machine with

25X1A5A2

25X1A5A2

Over the next 2 or 3 y

taking the position that the development of an MT ~~and~~ capability
was highly desirable and thus that the Agency should support an
MT program. At the same time, however, CIA recognized that such
a program had implications that transcended ^{its own} ~~the~~ interests of CIA

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

and even those of the intelligence community. The Agency therefore considered it preferable that an organization with broader responsibilities than its own be prevailed upon to take the initiative to push a comprehensive MT program. The immediate need was ^{for} ~~a~~ usable product--that is, one that might be far short of a perfect translation but nevertheless highly useful. ~~In return for an early MT capability to produce a usable product, the Agency was willing to leave the achievement of superior results to a longer range program.~~

In early 1955 CIA approached the National Science Foundation (NSF) and concurrently ascertained the degree of interest of the Department of Defense. ^{which was interested but could provide no funds.} These overtures were directly related ~~as~~ to one of a succession of proposals by Defense representatives were "all in substantial agreement that, while the Department of Defense does not find it possible to authorize any funds for this project, we will be very much interested in any such device once its feasibility has been firmly established." Negotiations with the NSF culminated in early 1956 in an exchange of correspondence between Dr. Alan T. Waterman, NSF Director, and Allen Dulles, DCI. The NSF agreed "to administer any part of a program of research in machine translation which is agreed by all concerned to be desirable." CIA recognized the need for careful planning and coordination "to insure maximum progress toward our immediate goal of a machine capability to translate the

25X1A5A1

EAM

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

Russian technical literature."

The DDI gave to OCR the responsibility for providing
a focal point for programs to develop MT. CIA provided
several hundred thousand dollars in support of the [] e-
[] project before it was finally brought to an end
Mechanical Translation

On 20 August 1958, [], who had been coordinating
the Agency's interests in mechanical translation, chaired the
first successful demonstration (held in Alexandria, Virginia) of
translation of chemical literature from Russian to English using an

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

46
electronic computer. This was a result of the
Gtn Project that OCR had been sponsoring
since 56.

Mechanical Translation Again

In late 1959 General Cabell, the DDCI, decided that a more

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

57

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

formal mechanism was required for providing advice and guidance for the development and implementation of the mechanical translation research program, which [] had been monitoring on behalf of the Agency since 1956. General Cabell considered this particularly necessary in ^{as much as} ~~view of the fact that~~ the Agency program was moving out of research into the operational phase for translation of Russian organic chemistry literature. Therefore, in September he designated ^{Mr.} [] the CIA Mechanical Linguistics Project Officer, to be responsible for the preparation of programs of research, development and operations in mechanical linguistics, in consultation with the CIA

Mechanical Linguistics Advisory Committee, which he established at the same time. (Mechanical linguistics was a term ^{somewhat more} ~~inclusive than mechanical translation.~~ ~~the translation from one natural language to another by mechanical means together with all the analytical techniques necessary to produce lexicons and to do structural analysis of languages by machine.~~) Upon approval of the DCI, Mr. [] was to

supervise the execution of these programs. At about the same time, CODIB established a Subcommittee on Mechanical Translation (SCOMT) and named ^{Mr.} [] its Chairman. Thus, Mr. [] was able to ~~Approved For Release 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000400070008-5~~ position in the Agency.

25X1A9A

25X1A9A

25X1A9A

25X1A9A

25X1A9A

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

Still more on MT

25X1A9A

25X1A9A At its 27th meeting, on 2 February, CODIB, on
~~SCOMT.~~
 recommendation, dissolved ~~is Subcommittee on~~
~~(SCOMT)~~
~~Mechanical Translation~~. One of the primary reasons for
doing so was that an Inter-Agency Committee[†] on Mechanical
Translation Research had been established, under the
chairmanship of the NSF, and including^{as} representatives fr
the same individuals from USIB agencies that were on the
~~former~~ CODIB subcommittee. Recognizing that the NSF-chaired
group was broader in its membership and interests than
~~the SCOMT~~ SCOMT, and wishing to maintain direct contact with
MT activities, CODIB ~~also~~ designated as their
liaison representative to that committee. ~~in addition to his~~
Approved For Release 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000400070008-5
~~release~~ CIA representative.

MT Research

25X1A5A2 Between 1956 and 1962 CIA had spent \$1.4 million in support of the [] MT Project. In April 1962 Mr. Borel, in a memorandum to the Acting DDI, pointed out that the project had been controversial since its inception and had survived largely because of the strong stand taken by [] as project officer. The principal point of disagreement between FDD (for whose principal aid in translation the project was initially designed) and the project officer ^{was} on how near they had come ~~to~~ achieving an MT operational capability.

25X1A9A

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

At The Project Review Committee questioned whether this was the kind of research the Agency should even be supporting. The attitude of the US Comptroller General on some of CIA's broad support programs tended to question the legitimacy of continued support. Moreover, in the congressional hearings of 1960 on mechanical translation, the Space Committee had clearly indicated that the NSF was to assume leadership in the field. NSF and Defense were by 1962 spending close to \$2 million annually on MT research. Mr. Borel therefore consulted with members of the CIA Advisory Committee on Mechanical Linguistics, the Comptroller, the DDR, Chief/FDD, Chief/ADPS, and the Assistant to the DDI (Administration). All agreed that the project should be discontinued. Mr. Borel therefore notified that the project was to be dropped. ^{25X1A5A2}financial support finally terminated in March 1963. OCR planned to participate in the future jointly with the NSF and Defense in a coordinated program of directed research responsive to the priority needs of the government.

~~Requiring the following:~~

~~1. Establish a 1963 study of the mechanical translation program.~~
~~2. Establish a 1963 study of the mechanical translation program.~~
~~3. Establish a 1963 study of the mechanical translation program.~~
~~4. Establish a 1963 study of the mechanical translation program.~~
~~5. Establish a 1963 study of the mechanical translation program.~~
~~6. Establish a 1963 study of the mechanical translation program.~~
~~7. Establish a 1963 study of the mechanical translation program.~~
~~8. Establish a 1963 study of the mechanical translation program.~~
~~9. Establish a 1963 study of the mechanical translation program.~~
~~10. Establish a 1963 study of the mechanical translation program.~~

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

~~The Library Consultants Report~~
~~Approved For Release 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000400070008-5~~

The major issue of 1957 for OCR was the Library Consultants Survey. In 1956 the DDI (Amory) ^{had} proposed to the DCI that a panel of library experts be engaged to make a special survey of the CIA Library. He apparently made this proposal largely upon the recommendation of Walter Pforzheimer, then one of his Special Assistants, who felt that the Library was in poor shape. Amory's first step was to establish an ad hoc Library Survey Committee in August 1956, with his Assistant for Planning, [] as Chairman. This committee, representing many segments of CIA, drew up the terms of reference for a panel of three outside librarians who were to survey the CIA Library and the OCR documentation.

25X1A9A

~~SECRET~~


SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

processes so that OCR could be certain of developing optimum efficiency and best possible use of space and manpower before moving into the new building.



25X1A5A2

25X1A5A2

The ^{consultants} ~~consultants~~ studied the operations of the Library and related activities for about 15 weeks, interviewing research analysts and conducting various ^a sample tests. They presented their final report to the DDI on 18 May 1957. It included some 150 "findings requiring action" and "recommendations" covering management, space, the collection policy and program, the acquisition program, the cataloging of books, the Reference Branch, the Card Catalog, Intellofax retrieval, the Bibliography Unit, the indexing of FBIS materials, the Circulation Branch, EDD, the Document and Machine Divisions, and the Minicard system.

The AD/CR found the specific ~~minimum~~ criticisms in the report disturbing indeed. In his first memorandum to the DDI

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

commenting on the report, on 7 June, he admitted that all but a few were at least partly valid and that though many served only to underline and emphasize defects of which they were already aware and for which they were already trying to find cures, some did reveal weaknesses whose existence OCR officials did not suspect. He was particularly concerned about three of the consultants' major recommendations-- (1) that OCR cease using microfilm aperture cards and return to hard copy files; (2) that they abandon the Intellofax system; and (3) that they expand the Intelligence Publications Index (IPI) into a monthly publication much like the Bibliography of Agriculture, which should include "all documents, books and periodicals that make a substantive contribution."

Dr. Andrews' second memorandum related to the Consultants' Report, dated 18 June, was directed to replying to criticism concerning the handling and usage of old Intellofax cards and Minicards. He found many of the consultants' statements to be "incorrect, irresponsible and misleading." On 1 July Dr. Andrews followed up with a third memorandum directed to the "Ten Horrible Cases" that the consultants cited in order to "point up some of the intellectual and mechanical problems of the Intellofax system." These 10 cases were the foundation on which the consultants based their major recommendation--that CIA abandon its ^{attempt} ~~attempt~~ to develop a mechanized indexing system and instead return to a conventional index to be published monthly.

Dr. Andrews admitted that these cases, if true, would be a "devastating indictment" of OCR. He did not merely accept them,

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

XXXXXX

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

← however. Instead, he carefully studied each case and found that only two of the mistakes cited had occurred as the consultants^{or} said they did, though these two were admittedly "serious cases involving human error, for which there was no excuse." Two others, he said, were similar, but the errors were caught and corrected within OCR, and the customers neither suffered from nor even knew about them. The other six cases, Andrews found, were "phonies...bogus and...reflect no discredit on our system." They did, however, show that, in Andrews' words, "the consultants handled at least this part of their survey in a manner so unbelievably careless that it can only be described as irresponsible." These were harsh words, indeed, and Andrews followed them up with a request for an investigation of the case by the Inspector General to still any suspicion that OCR ~~may~~ might have tampered with the records. (Apparently, ~~with no such suspicion~~ no such suspicion was voiced and no IG inspection was held.)

On 11 July, at the DDI's behest, Dr. Andrews made his final accounting on the Consultants' Report, taking each of its major points in turn. He recommended first that OCR continue with Intellofax and with planning for Minicard, doing its best to correct such genuine deficiencies as appeared; and continue to exclude most types of information reports ^{or} ~~and~~ unfinished intelligence ^{and books} from the IPI.

Dr. Andrews also offered his own speculation on the reasons for the ~~reckless and irresponsible~~ attack by the

SECRET

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

FOIAB6

← consultants on the Intellofax system.

FOIAB6

Dr. Andrews stated that the consultants' criticisms of the ISC were generally sound and that OCR was taking steps to comply with the recommendation that it be revised and made internally consistent.

A recommendation that the Map Library and FDD be merged into OCR on the ground that they were basically reference services was not new with the consultants--the 1956 IG report, in particular, had made the suggestion about FDD. ^{Dr.} Andrews recommended, however, that this suggestion not be considered until the Agency had occupied its new building.

The consultants also came up with a plan for a complete reorganization of OCR, with three Deputy ADs--one for Administrative Services, one for Reference Services and one for Technical Services. ^{Dr.} Andrews did not like the scheme they proposed, though he did feel that some sort of split in the chain of command would be necessary if Map Library and/or FDD were ever put under OCR. He

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

suggested that a better split, if one should be effected, would be two-way, rather than three-way, with perhaps a Deputy for Information Services, who would have under his charge ~~the~~ a central Reference Staff, the map and library reading rooms and the Registers, and a Deputy for Technical Support, who would have all the rest. He also suggested that thought might be given to the question of whether Liaison Division should not perhaps be transferred to ^{OO/CDS} ~~OO's Contact Division~~, inasmuch as in many respects it was already functionally closer to that Division than to OCR. (In 1958 ~~LD would be reorganized~~. ^{LD's} and in 1961 one of ~~the~~ ^{fact} branches would indeed be transferred to OO; ~~in 1967 LD would cease to exist altogether~~. In 1966 a Document Systems Group was formed that was similar to the Technical Support system envisaged by ^{Dr.} Andrews. The following year, ^{the rest of} OCR was completely reorganized into ~~two major units~~ the Information Services Group, ~~and the Document Systems Group, later renamed Support Services Group~~).

Another of the consultants' proposals was that OCR should create a Central Reference Staff, on which each of the Registers would have a liaison representative. ^{Dr.} Andrews felt that the proposal had some merit but that the consultants greatly exaggerated when they asserted that for want of such a staff ~~there~~ existed much confusion and duplication of effort. ^{existed} ~~Dr.~~ Andrews recommended that OCR begin building up the existing Reference Branch of the Library, emphasizing its position much as the consultants had suggested, and giving fairly intensive training to its members, but that they refrain from any formal

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

reorganization until they had had an experimental trial of the usefulness of putting Register liaison officers into the staff.

Explaining that the aperture card system had been developed in the first place ~~in order~~ to conserve floor space, to conserve file cabinets, and to ensure that the file would ^{YS} always be complete, ^{Dr.} Andrews recommended flatly that OCR reject the consultants' proposal with regard to a hard copy file.

The consultants suggested that in the new building OCR should be arranged in a circle of support elements surrounding the central reference point, or library. This ^{Dr.} Andrews agreed with. He did not, however, favor a number of recommendations the consultants made proposing space rearrangements prior to the move, inasmuch as all these proposals were based upon acceptance of the recommendations for abandoning Intellofax, going back to a conventional published index, and setting up x hard copy files.

Dr. Andrews agreed with the consultants' statement that OCR had held down the purchase of books for reasons of economy and because of space limitations. He did not, however, feel that they should rush into "building up the collections" once they were in the new building. Instead, he said, the Library should continue as it had in the past embarking on programs of acquisitions in specific fields as experience showed a need for more basic documents in those areas.

The consultants made a number of ~~unintended~~ criticisms of the Library's efficiency as compared with the ^{libraries of the} State Department

SECRET

~~XXXXX~~

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

~~Yale Library~~ and other such institutions. Many of these criticisms, ^{Dr.} Andrews noted, were unsound, being based on "faulty comparisons of the apples-versus-oranges variety." He therefore recommended that the charges of inefficiency and wasteful use of manpower be placed before the ^{Management} ~~Management~~ Staff, with a request that they be carefully analyzed and either proved or disproved.

Finally, the consultants called for a more aggressive and creative philosophy in OCR with respect to its functions and the development of a strong leadership both ~~within~~ and ~~without~~ ^{Dr.} OCR to properly provide for its effectiveness. ^{Dr.} Andrews' response to this suggestion was that it was naive--that the community could not be coordinated against its will, and that any attempt to provide it with aggressive leadership ~~by~~ by CIA would be instantly and strongly resented. He pointed out that much could be done by friendly discussion and voluntary agreement, but very little by fiat, citing the voluntary adoption by most agencies of OCR's ISC and other efforts toward adoption of OCR methods.

Resignation of Andrews

Simultaneously with his wrap-up comments on the ^{Dr.} Consultants' Report, Andrews submitted his resignation, to be effective on 23 August. As he put it,

...I have been sitting so long a time at the same desk that my job has ceased to be rewarding, and I now want nothing so much as to gain my release from the 8:30 to 5:00 routine. I really would not care to be Chief of Station in Paradise if that post required me to keep regular working hours and restrict my leave to twenty days a year.

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

It is doubtful whether the Consultants' Report caused Dr. Andrews' resignation, but it seems likely that it may have hastened his ^{and} decision.

The Library Consultants' Report, though apparently suppressed as much as possible within OCR, had a dramatic effect on the morale of the personnel of the Office. One of its many side effects, for instance, was a feeling that the report stressed a lack of professionalism in OCR's response to its service requirements. This did nothing to aid OCR in its long fight to demolish its unjustly applied reputation as primarily a clerical operation.

OCR had tried often to raise the grade level of its staff by stressing the professional knowledge and training required in many of its activities. The 1956 IG report on OCR had acknowledged the inequity of OCR's grade structure when compared to that of other DDI and Agency components and had recommended that an overall classification and wage review of OCR's grade structure be made. To some extent, the grade structure was revised, but it still had a long way to go. (The 1963 IG survey would find the ~~same~~ inequity in grade structure still in existence.)

The staff had also worked hard to provide the ~~maximum~~ consultants with statistics, special samplings and other ~~items~~ during its survey. To have any of these contributions misinterpreted, as turned out to be the case, helped to lower morale. The resignation of Dr. Andrews in the middle of all the post-

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

survey confusion did nothing to help matters. Further problems were added in August, when the DDI ordered OCR to reduce its personnel ceiling from 853 to 819.

New Administration

Once again, OCR was at a crossroads. Into it, on 9 September, stepped Dr. Andrews' successor, Paul A. Borel, a member of the Board of National Estimates and a former Secretary of the IAC. [] the DAD, was transferred at that time to OO and was replaced [], who had already been involved with OCR activities as Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Foreign Language Publications (ACFLP), head of the Working Group on Information Handling, and head of the ad hoc Library Survey Committee.

Dr. Andrews had been a good Director ~~for most of his~~ tenure, but he had, as he himself admitted, grown stale tied to the same desk for 9½ years. The injection of new blood in the persons of ^{Messrs.} Borel and [] had the potential for dispelling any parochialism that OCR had ~~not~~ developed in its first decade. Their wide experience in community activities also meant that OCR would ^{after all} ~~indeed~~ assume the position of aggressive leadership in the community that the consultants had felt was necessary, ~~and Andrews did not.~~ In addition, ^{Mr.} Borel recognized the low state of OCR's morale and devoted himself ~~entirely~~ to restoring its self-confidence by vigorously attempting to improve its image and by drawing his Division Chiefs into greater involvement in planning for the future of the Office.

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

Mr. Borel lost no time in getting down to work. His first concern, naturally, was to review existing programs and operations of the Office and, specifically, to evaluate the recommendations of the Library consultants in order to have a sound basis for making decisions with respect thereto. Borel and his team examined the Consultants' Reports in detail and found that several basic questions could be identified. They then decided to set up task forces within OCR, with extra-OCR assistance as necessary, to deal with each of the problems. The work of the task teams was to be coordinated by the Special Assistant to the AD/CR--Joe [redacted] the former Executive, with a new title.

On 8 November, Mr. Borel reported to the DDI on action already taken on problem areas in OCR. He stated that the current management program was to institute a continuing program of executive action designed to anticipate and relate individual actions that might be required, and to facilitate follow-up on the staff work undertaken to provide a sound basis for making decisions; to overhaul the internal management reports program of OCR in order to arrive at meaningful and integrated periodic activity reports culminating in an OCR annual report; and to analyze the Library Consultants' Report in the manner already noted above.

Mr. Borel also noted that when specific action could be taken before a major task study was completed, this would be done. He cited one example of such action that had already been taken--as suggested by the consultants, OCR had taken

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

over the OTR Library in order to make this specialized ~~library~~ service an integral part of the Agency's overall library facilities. (The addition of the OTR Library's six slots raised the overall OCR T/O to 825.)

Mr. Borel also accomplished two more organizational changes in the October-November 1957 period. First he dissolved the Operations Staff and reassigned its functions and personnel to appropriate OCR components. Then he reconstituted the Statistical Branch of SR as a Division of OCR. He did this for two reasons--to free the Chief of SR from supervisory responsibility for the branch, in view of the magnitude of his other duties, and to exercise more direct supervision over it from his own office. As Mr. Borel pointed out to the DDI when he first proposed the change in October, ^{the} ~~the~~ branch was actually separate from the rest of SR by mission, function and location. Furthermore, its formative period was complete, and its operations were of a divisional character--that is, the branch was directly faced with pressures exerted by all parts of the intelligence community, inter-Agency committees, the Director, the DDI's Office and the Project Director. The new Division was established with three branches--Information, Technical and Support, ^{and} ~~and~~ was

25X1A9A headed by SD was not to remain long in

^{mid-}OCR, however. In ~~July~~ ^{mid-}1958 it was transferred to the newly established Photographic Intelligence Center (PIC) ^{later} ~~National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC)~~.

~~Approved 1957~~

~~One of~~

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

Borel's Task Teams

In November Mr. Borel established 16 Task Teams to study and evaluate the findings of the Library Consultants. Most of /The Task Teams were chaired by OCR personnel, and 37 of the team members were OCR employees. Other offices in the Agency cooperated in the study by contributing the services of more than 30 of their own employees as Task Team members. The Teams and their Chairmen were as follows:

25X1A9A

1. Intellofax
2. Machine Use
3. Coding
4. Selection
5. Acquisition Operations
6. Fiscal Policy
7. Publications Procurement
8. Circulation
9. Catalog
10. Reference
11. Information Center
12. Minicard
13. Reports
14. Training
15. Customer Relations
16. Correlative Functions

25X1A9A

25X1A9A

No Foreign D

The task teams were coordinated by

No Foreign Dissem

Task Team Reports

By May the Task Teams had completed their reports,
and on 10 May Mr. Borel drew up a summary statement of the
team evaluations. He found that overall the area of agreement

h

SECRET
No Foreign Dissem

39

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

between the respective findings, conclusions and recommendations of the teams and those of the Library Consultants was somewhere between 50 and 60 percent. In some cases the findings of the consultants were validated, but different conclusions or recommendations were reached. In other cases, the findings could not be validated, but similar conclusions or recommendations were arrived at.

The first 12 Task Teams dealt with operations of the Library and the Machine and Document Divisions and will be ^{discussed} ~~discussed~~ in the chapter of this History devoted to those bodies. The other four will be ^{discussed} ~~discussed~~ below.

TT13 studied the OCR operational reporting program, specifically to determine if too much ~~tax~~ time was spent keeping unnecessary records; if ^{existing} ~~present~~ monthly reports could be revised to better reflect information of special value to management; and if an annual (or semiannual) report could be devised as an integral part of OCR's report system, which report would be of value to top Agency management as well as to supervisors within OCR. The Task Team was in virtual agreement with the ^{consultants} ~~consultants~~ on these points. Even before they made their final report, a new system of monthly (later changed to quarterly) reporting was designed and put into operation within the divisions of OCR. In addition, Mr. Porel planned the issuance of an OCR annual report. (Such reports were subsequently issued on a fiscal year basis.)

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

TT 14 studied the training policies of OCR and OTR to determine if professional employees of OCR should be given the same training program, particularly in the introductory courses, as were the analysts in producing offices in the Agency; and if a training program could be devised that would enable the professional staff of OCR to give a higher level of reference service to users of OCR facilities from the intelligence community. The team agreed that professional OCR employees should continue to receive the same training in courses having common application as did analysts from ORR and OSI. They felt that raising the level of OCR reference service involved more than a question of training, inasmuch as training beyond that appropriate to an individual's grade would result in a transfer to another job of higher grade, rather than in a sustained higher level of service at the same grade. The team thought that the OCR training program should be tailored to the specific needs of the individual within the general requirements of the division in which he worked.

The 15th Task Team studied means whereby OCR could get adequate guidance for its operations from customer offices. Specifically, they sought to determine whether a Library Committee composed of representatives of all the components of the Agency should be created to serve in an advisory capacity to the AD/CR and as a channel of communication to the Agency; and if a program should be developed to bring together the analyst and the reference staff so that

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

the latter might be aware as much as possible of what intelligence reports and programs were under way so that the staff might give a higher level reference service and be prepared to call to the attention of the analyst pertinent documents, periodical articles, intelligence reports, books, etc., which was a normal special library technique and service. The team fully concurred with the consultants in these matters. One important aspect, in fact, was well under way by the time they finished their study: Instead of the Library Committee recommended by the consultants, Mr. Borel had established the more widely based CRAG.

The team's other recommendation was that a program should be developed to establish closer rapport between research analysts and reference personnel and that this program should include briefings and tours of OCR facilities and the preparation for publication and wide distribution of a handbook explaining OCR services and facilities. By May 1958 such a program was ~~already~~ well under way.

The last Task Team studied the feasibility and desirability of regrouping within OCR certain reference-type functions then the ~~the~~ responsibility of other offices, specifically the Map Library of ORR; the FDD of OO; the Historical Intelligence Collection (HIC), then under the ODDI; and the OTR Library. By the time the team made its report, the OTR Library had already been transferred to OCR. The team recommended that ~~XXX~~ FDD not be transferred on the grounds that it was not a reference service. They recognized

~~SECRET~~

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

X3 ✓
that the Map Library was indeed a reference service but recommended that it remain in ORR because of the inter-relationships of the Map Library and other activities in the geographic area of ORR. They noted that the transfer of the HIC awaited action on the IG report on the O/DDI. (The HIC was transferred to OCR in 1959.) In addition, the team proposed highly trained research and reference personnel for staffing a central reference unit, an independent OCR capability for first-echelon linguistic service, and an integrated program for all reference functions of the Agency.

After Mr. Borel had had time to digest the Task Team reports, he invited the ~~three~~ Library Consultants back for 3 days in May to meet with the Task Team Chairmen to evaluate the total Library program. The Consultants expressed their satisfaction with the progress made and their enthusiasm for the planned program.

Approved For Release 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000400070008-5

PROGRAM FOR CHANGES

On 12 June Mr. Banel submitted to the PDT his
Approved For Release 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000400070008-5

"immediate program for implementing recommendations of the consultants and the task teams." In general, this program involved the reorganization of OCR's reference service; the organization of an Automation Development Group in OCR; a number of changes in storage and retrieval procedures, including revision of the ISC to make it a community code; the modification of several operational procedures in the Library and the Machine Division; the drafting of a program for CODIAC and other actions related to publications procurement; several changes in administrative procedures, including installation of a new divisional monthly reports program and the publication of an OCR handbook; and the centralization of the information reference service.

The first order of business after OCR obtained approval for its program of changes was to reorganized the Library. Changes included reduction of ceiling by eight positions (from 19* 149 to 141); an increase in the average grade level from GS-7.7 to GS-8.4; improved administrative and professional guidance within the overall Library organizational structure; the establishment of a Staff Assistant position to provide the CIA Librarian with support in coordinating internal library activities;

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

45

More on the Consultants' Report and the Task Teams

59 On 12 May Mr. Borel submitted to the DDI a R "Progress Report on OCR Program to Implement Recommendations of the Consultants and Task Teams." In it he summed up the measures OCR had taken throughout the previous year to improve its reference services, especially with regard to improvements in the Intellofax system and revision of the ISC. ^{He} ~~Mr. Borel~~ also summed up changes in procedures concerning the procurement and control of open literature, a perennial problem because of dual administration of the publications procurement program by CIA and the State Department.

Mr. Borel ~~also~~ listed briefly the changes in administrative procedures resulting from the Library Consultants' recommendations.

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

Pl'a

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

and the strengthening of the reference function under a
Chief Reference Librarian, who was also to serve as division
deputy.

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

such as installation of new divisional quarterly reporting program, the development of training guides, and the establishment of the ADG. Finally, ^{he} ~~Mr. Borel~~ listed various long-range problems and lines of action, such as the pending decision on Minicard and the encouragement of analysts to educate themselves on the application of computers to intelligence data processing. In the latter regard, Mr. Borel felt that the efforts of CIA to organize an Agencywide approach to computer applications plus the return in 1960 of Joe Becker from his special training in that field ~~would~~ ^{do} seem to promise increasing OCR responsibility there, including closer cooperation with offices undertaking specific applications.

Another Howerton Trip

25X1A9A

60 During April-June [] again took an overseas trip on behalf of OCR. Accompanied by [] the Librarian and Secretary of PROCIB, he surveyed publications and graphic materials available in Africa south of the Sahara. The two men also attended the Second Conference of Publications Officers, held in Paris.

Another Borel Trip

In the late summer Mr. Borel once again ventured abroad.

25X1A9A

Accompanied by [] Director of SCIPS, [] SA/AD/CR, and representatives of CODIB, he attended the International Federation of Information Processing Congress in Munich from 27 August to 3 September. Afterward, members of the group visited other areas in Europe to survey information file holdings and processing procedures.

25X1A9A

25X1A9A

Travel

The ~~Howarth~~ Borel- team was to go down in OCR history as the most ~~well~~^{widely} traveled of all the top leadership of the Office. Throughout their tenures, they ~~xxx~~ seemed to be almost constantly on the move, attending conferences and demonstrations of new equipment; giving speeches on various aspects of OCR's work, and generally seeking information of

value to the office, both in the United States and abroad. Much of their travel was connected with their activities as Chairmen of various inter-

The first major trip taken by either member of the agency groups (CODIB, PROCIB).

OCR top team was ~~Mr~~ From 28 February 25X1A9A

May, accompanied by , C/GR, and

who was responsible for the fiscal administration of the

25X1A9A

pu

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

publications procurement program, he visited 28 cities in 19 countries of Europe and the Middle East. The purposes of the tour were to accelerate and simplify the graphics and publications procurement programs. Responsibility to collect graphics and publications, with the initiative assigned to a member of the Embassy staff, was established in each country. Fourteen of these officers, newly appointed, received their first briefings from the tour party. In [redacted], during 16-18 April, Mr. [redacted] chaired a conference of Publications Procurement Officers (PPOs) from [redacted]. As a result of the trip, the number of spontaneously selected publications more than doubled. In June 1958, alone, more than 1100 photographs or negatives were received that were directly attributed to the trip.

25X1A9A

25X1A6A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Paul Borel--Around the World in 92 Days

Approved For Release 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000400070008-5

On 21 September 1978 ~~Paul~~ Borel left on a trip around

the world; he returned on 22 December. During most of the trip

25X1A9A


he was accompanied by [] of the CIA Library. The

major purposes of the trip were:

25X1C8A



2. To promote, on behalf of the intelligence community, programs of American Embassies and Consulates General for the procurement of foreign publications and photography of intelligence value.



25X1X7

4. To obtain information and appreciation of US intelligence

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

No Foreign Dissem

47

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

← community problems in handling intelligence information, particularly those relating to areas of responsibility of OCR, CODIB and PROCIB.

25X1C8A

Borel considered the single most impressive accomplishment of the [] Conference to be "the crystallization in more tangible form of an international intelligence community." At the conference he presented a paper, "On Processing Intelligence Information," which was well received.

25X1A9A

With regard to the procurement of publications and graphics, the [] 25X1A9A [] carried out essentially the same program as had [] and his associates in Europe and the Near East the previous spring. Mr. Borel felt that his talks with senior officials at ^{various} ~~various~~ diplomatic and consular missions would result in an increase in the flow of valuable information through the graphics and publications procurement programs, but that these programs were not soundly based because (a) language competence in missions was low; (b) personnel turnover was extremely high; (c) no accurate measure of performance versus potential was taken; (d) collection effort was not sufficiently related to the capabilities to exploit the material once collected; and (e) coordination in the field was marginal.

25X1A9A

25X1

25X1X7

25X1X7

SECRET
No Foreign Dissem



1967

During the last three quarters of FY 1967 the OCR information processing systems underwent intensive study and reassessment in preparation for a comprehensive reorganization and streamlining of the entire central reference function. This activity was one phase of a general plan for restructuring and realigning the Agency's intelligence production offices and their supporting specialized service functions. The objective was to

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

130

SECRET
No Foreign Dissem

1957

Liaison Division's New Program

In April 1957 the Liaison Division began a new direct collection program for overt intelligence exploitation of US Government sources in the Washington area. OCR was authorized to publish the foreign intelligence information product derived from the program in a new CIA Information Report form, the CR series.

The reasons for initiating this program were as follows:

1. realization that a substantial quantity of foreign positive intelligence and other information was available from US Government ~~and~~ sources as a result of foreign travel and professional correspondence;
2. recognition that no systematic exchange of such information was occurring; and
3. knowledge that existing NSCIDs and DCIDs did not specifically cover exploitation of US Government ~~and~~ sources in the United States.

Operational techniques used in this direct collection included the development and expansion of new sources; the solicitation from CIA and IAC customers of intelligence requirements applicable to specific sources; briefings, if appropriate, prior to sources' departures; and, in all cases, exploitation by personal interview with source. The product was then published in the CR Report series and disseminated to the intelligence community. In addition to the actual exploitation of sources, significant foreign documentary material obtained by US nationals through means other than foreign travel or direct contact with

SECRET
No Foreign Dissem

Approved For Release 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000400070008-5

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

foreigners was collected and processed by OCR for Agency and intelligence community use.

Noteworthy in this endeavor was the evidence of cooperation from intelligence ~~and~~ ^{ra} components of the military services in arranging for the exploitation of their own controlled sources in the Technical Services and research and development areas, and in making the intelligence product available to the community. Within CIA, the program stimulated closer working relationships between OCR, in its collection role, and the analysts and researchers of consumer offices, and between OO/CD and DCR/LD in ensuring maximum exploitation of US sources.

Approved For Release 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000400070008-5

In May the ^{Liaison}~~Liaison~~ Division of OCR was reorganized.

396
First a Collection Branch was established to fill an overt collection gap, namely exploitation of US Government officials in the Washington area who through TDY travel abroad, correspondence with foreigners or contact with foreign visitors to the United States, obtained intelligence information of use to the community. The branch grew out of the old International Conferences Branch. Upon creation of the Collection Branch, the requirements coordination function was transferred to Liaison Branch, and a direct, rather than indirect, collection activity was initiated, extending its exploitation horizon beyond the conference and trade fair media. The division was then renamed Liaison and Collection Division (LCD).

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

Liaison Activities Again Reorganized

In July the Collection Branch of LCD, with 10 positions, was transferred to ~~OO/CD~~ ^{OO/CD}. LCD was renamed Liaison Staff (LS). The International Conferences Unit was transferred from LS to BR, with one position.

The merger of Collection Branch and OO/CD had been the subject of informal discussion on the working level for several years. The mission and functions of the branch were the same as those of OO/CD, except that the sources in Collection Branch's case were government employees rather than nongovernment employees. Moreover, the branch's mission and functions did not resemble those of its parent office, and with existing and prospective pressures on OCR's basic information storage and retrieval responsibility, the office found it increasingly difficult to provide a level of support that would permit the development of the activity's high potential. Mr. Borel therefore recommended that for the benefit of the Agency and the community as a whole, the branch be combined with OO/CD.

ABOLITION OF LIAISON STAFF

In December Mr. Boral, then the Director of Intelligence Support, submitted to the DDI a proposal for organizational moves in the Intelligence Support Services that would, among other things, abolish OCR's Liaison Staff. The actions he recommended were as follows:

1. To abolish LS as then constituted.
2. To constitute a small DCS element in the CIA Headquarters building, to function as the CIA Protocol Staff (mainly organizing and conducting briefings and debriefings) but also to provide a DCS beachhead in headquarters.
3. To assign the function of conducting operational liaison with the non-USIB agencies to the DCS Washington Field Office.
4. To assign the function of conducting operational liaison with the USIB agencies to the Human Resources Group (HRG) of CGS.

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

129

At some time in early 1959 the CIA historical Intelligence Collection was transferred to the jurisdiction of the AD/CR so that the management of the historical materials could be closely coordinated with CIA Library facilities. By the time the HIC was moved into OCR it was believed to be the finest library of overt intelligence materials in the world, containing some 6,000 volumes collected since its establishment.

The HIC contained then, as it does now, books in all languages from all countries. Its subject headings included espionage, counterintelligence, unconventional warfare, resistance, escape and evasion, subversion, cryptography, economic, political and psychological warfare, law treatises, legislative committee records on un-American activities, and many other intelligence tradecraft topics. From the beginning it was useful in many ways. Valuable precedents and practical tips were uncovered in historical intelligence materials that were useful for operational and training purposes. It was also

SECRET

~~maximum~~

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

possible to establish that there were traditions in American intelligence, going back to the founding of the country, that provided a historical foundation for building up a CIA heritage to which career employees could point with pride.

512w
first (and only, as of 1972)
The Curator of the HIC was ~~(and still is as of 1972)~~

Walter Pforzheimer, who had a large personal collection of historical intelligence items, which he had begun in 1946. The HIC contained fiction as well as nonfiction. The works of fiction were selected according to the following criteria: (1) The books should be based on fact. (2) Any book mentioning CIA should be acquired. (3) Some books were acquired because they ~~as~~ looked like good reading, in the opinion of the Curator. Mr. Pforzheimer provided for the HIC photostats of some rare items from

DCID 1/9

58
In December, under the sponsorship of CODIB, DCID 1/9 was issued. This Directive for the first time gave to the biographic systems of the intelligence community a definition of their respective reference and data exchange responsibilities. OCR/BR assumed responsibility for scientific and technical biographic coverage, which it had previously been granted ^{10 years earlier} by NSCID 8, ~~several years earlier~~.

Minimization of

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

these dividends would be forthcoming only if the members of the community were solidly behind a committee approach. Inasmuch as this proposal did not get into the DCID, its final form was little changed from the 1948 Directive, except for the introduction of clarification and additional detail.

LCD subsequently stimulated the production of a new DCID concerning exploitation of US Government officials.

DCID 2/8

During 1960-61 exploitation of US Government officials engaged in TDY travel or receiving foreign visitors resulted in reporting improved in both quality and quantity. The value of this source attracted USIB attention to the extent that

DCID 2/8 (New Series), "Domestic Exploitation of US Government

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

71

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

Organizations and Officials," was approved and distributed on 21 March. It was originally drafted by OCR. By May 1961 ~~the~~ Mr. Borel was able to state that DCID 2/8 ~~and~~ had already begun to facilitate the work of the Collection Branch of LCD.

NSCID 2

On 21 April 1958 NSCID 2, Coordination of Collection Activities, was issued. Those of its provisions that were particularly important to OCR were the following:

The CIA, as a service of common concern, was to be responsible for the selective exploitation within the United States of nongovernmental organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information.

The CIA was to conduct the exploitation of foreign language publications for intelligence purposes, as appropriate, as a service of common concern.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

27

Community Activities in ^{the} Publications Field

In May the IAC approved two new DCIDs--2/4, on the exploitation of foreign language publications, and 2/5 on the procurement of foreign publications. Both affected OCR. DEID 2/4 stated that CIA (a) would, as a service of common concern, provide for the exploitation of foreign language publications for intelligence purposes in accordance with requirements established by the IAC departments and agencies; and (b) would coordinate this service with similar activities maintained by the various departments and agencies of the government to satisfy their departmental requirements.

SECRET

~~Thruout the max max~~

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

The other government agencies and departments were to keep CIA advised of departmental activities in the exploitation and translation of foreign language publications.

DCID 2/4 also established the Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications, an interdepartmental body under the chairmanship of CIA that was to advise and assist CIA in the implementation of the DCID.

DCID 2/5 stated that the IAC departments and agencies (a) would keep CIA advised of their activities in the procurement of foreign publications, including the effectiveness of their existing facilities and programs for the procurement of foreign publications; (b) would ensure cooperation by their field representatives with those of other departments and agencies of the government engaged in like activities; and (c) would implement the above with due regard to departmental and agency capabilities and priorities. CIA was to coordinate programs for the procurement of foreign publications to ensure the most effective and practicable utilization of the capabilities of the government departments and agencies. This DCID also established the Committee on Procurement of Foreign Publications (PROCIAC),

an interdepartmental committee under the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence.

Approved For Release 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000400070008-5

[] was designated Chairman.

On 9 March DCID 2/1 (New Series), "Coordination of
Approved For Release 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000400070008-5
Overt Collection Abroad," was issued. This DCID, initiated
by OCR's LCD, served to implement in part NSCID 2, "Coordination
of Collection Activities." It superseded DCID 2/1, "Implementation
of Coordination of Collection Plan," dated 25 October 1948. OCR
originally hoped that in the revision of DCID 2/1 agreement
could be reached to form a USIB Committee to Coordinate
Guidance for Overt Collection Abroad. This was rejected by
all USIB representatives, however, and was also opposed within
the Agency by OSI and ORR. The consensus was that certain
aspects of the problem of coordinating collection were already
the responsibility of existing USIB subcommittees. Other
aspects of the collection problem were not considered appropriate
for resolution by committee but ~~should be handled~~^{pr} by the parties
concerned on an ad hoc basis.

Mr. Borel did not wholly share this view, feeling that
guidance to the field, follow-through on requirements and
evaluations, the development of mutual support programs in
overt collection, field-headquarters relations, and awareness
in Washington of what was already available^{bl} were problem areas,
concerted attack on which would yield^{ic} impressive results. He
nevertheless^w went along with the others because he felt that

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

In July OCR established its Automation Development Group (ADG)--a small staff with documentation and technical backgrounds to follow automation developments in industry and government and to plan applications of new equipment in OCR.

25X1A9A

The head of the ADG was [] previously Chief/ Planning Staff/ MD. In August ~~the~~ Mr. Borel proposed to the DDS that the Management Staff undertake an overall study of ~~the~~ Agency computer needs, including feasibility of a Computer Center in the new building. This suggestion led to an ADP responsibilities study, which was completed in the Agency ~~in~~ in January 1959, and eventually to Project ^{Computer} CHIVE and other developments, ~~related to computer operations.~~

25X1A9A

In August [] left to begin 2 years of training at the Western Data Processing Laboratory, ^{to} UCLA. The objective of this training was to provide him with knowledge of computers for possible application to Agency information processing programs.

25X1A9A

25X1A9A

25X1A9A [] Chief/ DD, succeeded Becker as SA/AD/CR, and [] Deputy, [] moved up to C/ DD. [] also succeeded Becker as Executive Secretary of CODIAC.

25X1A9A

Automatic Data Processing

At least in part because of Mr. Borel's August 1958

Approved For Release 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000400070008-5
memorandum calling for a Management Staff study of the Agency's

computer needs, such a study was completed in early 1959 and approved by the DCI in May. The study concluded that CIA needed a composite data processing program and recommended that a data processing committee be established, that a review be made of the end products from existing data processing installations to ascertain current requirements for them; that MS conduct a study to ascertain how existing machine installations could be centralized and to what extent computer-type machines could replace existing machines under centralized conditions; and that computer requirements be established by the DDI operating offices.

On 25 June CIA Notice 7-200-2 established an Automatic Data Processing Committee (ADPC) to provide Agencywide guidance and authoritative screening for all aspects of data processing requirements and equipment to serve such requirements. The Committee was to deal with the utilization of existing automatic data processing machines for existing and ^{new purposes,} ~~new uses,~~ compatibility

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

54

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

of new and existing machines, value of end products and assessment of costs against end-product value. The DDS provided the Chairman of the Committee, and the DDS, DDI and DDP each provided a member. The DDI member was Mr. Borel.

25X1A9A

Even before the establishment of the ADPC, CRAG was considering methods of ~~maintain~~ training Agency personnel in how computers worked, what they could do and how to program them to make them do what they could. In early July 12 officers from O/DDI, ORR, OSI, OCR and DDP were selected

for special training in electronic data processing machines

In accordance with the MS study recommendations, with DDI oral instructions to the IADs, and with instructions in N 7-200-2, CRAG investigated possible EDPM applications in the DDI area. ~~CRAG found that the~~ Their conclusions were presented as CRAG 9/2/59 in August. CRAG found that the nature of many functions performed in the DDI area was similar to cases in which EDPM applications had succeeded. They noted that the mere existence of such areas did not necessarily mean that a computer must be obtained. First, they must ascertain whether application would mean improvement, which improvement would be gained by securing greater accuracy and more timely data, greater reliability among data, potential for expansion, needed data ~~not~~ previously available, and economy of time, manpower, ~~a~~ space or money.

CRAG concluded that the need for securing some of the above objectives ~~were~~ was clearly indicated in various DDI situations.

As far as OCR was concerned, they noted that:

1. The volume of incoming information exceeded processing capabilities based on existing manual or EAM techniques.
2. The proportion of receipts that could be fully processed was declining.

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

3. Service from existing facilities was becoming slower as the size of the several indexes increased.
4. Quality of service in terms of listing, subject correlation, updating and display was declining or not offered because of the limitations of staff and equipment.

CRAG also found ~~limited~~ indicated applications in ORR and OSI. They concluded that the rapid evolution of the computer and the existing level of its capabilities in information processing offered significant potential support for and improvement in the quality of information in the DDI area.

CRAG then recommended:

1. That their report be sent to the ADPC in compliance with the call for the computer requirements of the DDI area.
2. That it be the policy of DDI operating officials to develop staff competence in the computer art and to conduct continuing and intensive planning for and testing of applications of automatic data processing equipment to DDI programs.
3. That an EDPM feasibility study for the DDI area be undertaken. The scope of this study was to cover the requirements of all DDI offices and also to determine (1) ^{MT} what computer requirements should be met from within CIA; (2) the role of the Minicard system in an assumed computer center; and (3) what use could be made of the excess capacities of the prospective DDP WALNUT computer (a special-purpose biographic system) and the DDS KAX RCA-501.

The investigation of computer applications in the DDI area
moved toward implementation in December 1959 with the appointment
25X1A9A
of OCR's [] to the DDI's staff as head of the DDI Feasibility
later the Automation Group.
Team, ^ Inasmuch as Becker was still assigned to the Western Data
Processing Laboratory, UCLA, and was not expected back until June

25X1A9A
1960, [] of the DDI was chosen to direct certain

SECRET
No Foreign Dissem

58

*feasibility
studies*

Computer Surveys

Approved For Release 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000400070008-5
~~Development Corporation~~ conducted 6-week surveys of the
DDI computer need. Both submitted their reports to CIA
in March. In brief, the IBM paper recommended that the DDI
upgrade its machine operations to the computer level and
simultaneously undertake a major system design effort to meet
future needs. The SDC found that the DDI was seriously ^{behind} ~~behind~~
the state of the information handling art and computing efforts
in other parts of the community and recommended that a very large

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

67

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

scale effort be launched immediately, with heavy contractor participation, to restructure and automate wherever feasible CIA's information processing.

~~The following month~~ ^{In} (April) ² the DDI Automation Staff issued a paper recommending that the DDI establish a Computer Center, implement production applications on the computer in direct support of DDI intelligence officers, and undertake a major system design effort in the document and information retrieval field. Reactions from the IADs to the Automation Staff's paper were submitted during May and June. They were generally favorable, endorsing the basic recommendation that the DDI should establish a computing capability.

Mr. Borel still felt that the ultimate goal should be a CIA Computer Center, embracing the capability to meet the needs of DDI, DDS and DDP. Assuming, however, that no CIA-wide center could then be had, he strongly opposed the creation of another CIA operational component in which to vest responsibility for managing a DDI computing facility. Instead, ^{ADP Staff (a new creation under the DDS to be operative as of 1 June, with [redacted] as Chief)} he felt, the CIA ~~ADP Staff~~ should conduct the exploratory phase of systems development and experimentation in the DDI area and that any computing center resulting from such exploration should be placed as an operating component under AD/CR. He also recommended that the DDI Automation Staff should be ~~not~~ abolished as a separate component in view of the creation under the DDS of ^{to be} an Agency ADP Staff ~~effective 1 June, with [redacted] as its Chief, as well as Chairman of the ADPC).~~ ^{dominant} ~~Then AD/CR would be the~~ Mr. Borel also recommended that CRAG play the dominant role in developing

25X1A9A

25X1A9A

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

68

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

objectives and plans concerning the computer center.

Some of Mr. Borel's recommendations were accepted. When the CIA ADPS was created in June, the DDI Automation Staff and the CIA Management Staff were both abolished. Ceiling authorizations and selected personnel from these two staffs were combined to form the ADPS.

In September the DDI, Mr. Amory, formally approved the Automation Staff's proposal for developing a DDI computing ~~xx~~ program. Colonel White, the DDS, approved the EDP development program for the DDI the following month. ~~The program was~~ scheduled to begin in January 1962, ~~it~~ was to be called Project CHIVE.

The ADPS was charged with implementing the EDP development program for the DDI area with the assistance of the offices of the DDI. ~~xxx~~ The staff was to report operationally to the ~~DDI~~ in carrying out its assignment but was also to keep CRAG fully informed of its activities within the DDI area. The program was to be developed within a DDI-wide context, taking into account computing activities elsewhere within the Agency and the community, as necessary. The program called for the establishment of a single Computer Center for the DDI area, which would be established and operated by the ADPS during its developmental period and then assigned by the DDI within his area ^{he} as deemed appropriate. The program was to be planned, controlled and executed predominantly by CIA personnel. Contractors were to be employed only to provide certain technical skills not available within the Agency but needed in carrying out the overall DDI

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

development program.

OCR assistance was to be needed for many parts of the DDI computer program. The ADPS planned to do as much as possible of the preparation of data for input for a special project, but it planned to call for assistance from the office sponsoring the project or from OCR, where such ~~skill~~ skills already existed in high degree, ~~depending~~ depending upon which office was more appropriate to the task at hand. An intimate working relationship between ADPS members and the components of OCR was also considered necessary to the effective pursuit of the systems design effort. In addition, rather than establish an independent EAM facility to support the computer program, the ADPS planned to look to OCR to provide this type of support via already established facilities. Finally, the initial hardware element of the DDI Computer Center was to be located in space assigned to ^{SA/}OCR, and the ADPS card and tape punch ~~unit~~ equipment was to be located in the Punch Unit of SR.

Approved For Release 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000400070008-5

Approved For Release 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000400070008-5

In October the DDI directed a memorandum to all the

IADs on the subject of Project CHIVE. He listed the three principal tasks in CHIVE and their current progress:

1. To establish a computer center for the DDI.
2. To implement selected computing and data processing applications on the CHIVE computer in direct support of DDI intelligence officers.
3. To conduct a study and systems design effort to satisfy future DDI needs, primarily in the areas of document retrieval and automated information systems.

Mr. Cline stated that he had recently reviewed the CHIVE program carefully. He thought it was ² well balanced and timely and

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

87

*expressed his full
endorsement of it.*

Approved For Release 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000400070008-5

OCR continued during the ~~the~~ early 1960's to provide
 Approved For Release 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000400070008-5
 major staff support to CODIB through the facilities of the
 OAD, and particularly through its EXA, as Secretary of CODIB.
 The ~~office~~ chief preoccupation of CODIB during FY 1964 was
 the Stage I report of SCIPS and subsequent actions related
 thereto. After review of the SCIPS final report, ~~by CODIB~~ ^{CODIB} it
 was proposed in June 1964 that the name SCIPS be dropped and
 that a permanent group known as the CODIB Support Staff (CSS)
 be established, consisting of senior intelligence officers from
 DIA and CIA (two each), with clerical support from CIA. The
 staff was subsequently housed within OCR and the slots for the
 two CIA officers and two clerks were taken from OCR's T/O.

The CSS mission was to support CODIB in promoting
 means by which the intelligence community could make optimal
 use of information of intelligence value, however recorded. The
 staff was fully operational by October 1964.

In addition to the CSS, CODIB organized various ad hoc task
 teams to cope with a number of specific ~~problems~~ problems, such as
 content control, bibliographies, foreign publications, biographies,
 and analyst communication. The Bibliographies (later Item
 Identification) and Foreign Publications Task Teams were chaired
 by OCR personnel 25X1A9A respectively.

The EXA/AD/CR, 25X1A9A continued during this time
 to act as Secretary for CODIB and was closely involved in the
 SECRET
 No Foreign Dissem

104

*key to day guidance of the CSS & of
 the ad hoc task teams.*

CHIVE

Approved For Release 2004/08/31 : CIA-RDP84-00951R000400070008-5

In mid-1963 ~~the CHIVE Phase I ended.~~ This was the

~~fact finding phase.~~ In submitting the Phase I report to the DDI, ^{the} ADPS requested that DDI management approve Phase II (systems design). The DDI then established a CHIVE Evaluation Group, composed of representatives from OCR and several other DDI offices, as well as the DDP and the DDS&T. Paul Borel ^{was} ~~was~~ Chairman of this group; was a member representing OCR.

After the evaluation of ~~CHIVE~~ ^{the} Phase I report, approval was given to proceed into Phase II, which was to be managed by OCR, with OCS giving support by designing a more effective system. The original concept of CHIVE as development of a DDI Computer Center had undergone major modifications after the establishment of OCS and its location, with most of the Agency's computer hardware, in the DDS&T. On 6 April 1964 the DDI issued Notice 50-100-39, announcing that OCR and OCS were now associated in a long-range program for investigation of the application of automatic data processing equipment to the central information storage and retrieval activities of the Agency. This developmental program was to cut across all Agency organizational ~~in~~ lines in that the information needs of all components were ^{to} be considered. The initial design goals were pointed toward all-source and all-topic single-entry-point

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

106

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

service; both information and document retrieval systems were
25X1A9A DDI
to be explored. [redacted] ~~DDI/AD/CS~~ was appointed CHIVE
Officer, in ~~addition~~ ^{addition} to his regular duties. In this capacity
he was to represent the management of CIA ^{operating} ~~operation~~
components with the AD/CS in defining program objectives
and serving as the primary information channel to Agency
management; coordinate relations between CHIVE and Agency
operating personnel in such areas as user needs, statistics,
testing, organizational and procedural planning; and
approve CHIVE scope, tasks, schedules and directions on
behalf of higher management.

Work during Fiscal Year 1964 on the Phase II part
of CHIVE consisted primarily of extending and refining
preliminary design concepts coupled with some initial
testing of indexing techniques. In December 1963 a formal
report was issued whose purpose was twofold: (1) to present
a set of preliminary functional specifications and (2) to
indicate critical problems areas in system design. Succeeding
studies addressed themselves to more specific tasks. Detailed
design was scheduled to continue through calendar year 1965, with
a target date for initial system implementation on one geographic
area (China) in early 1966.

ADP Committee

25X1A9A

In March Mr. [] was named the DDI representative on the ~~reactivated~~ ADP Committee, reactivated ~~and~~ by Mr. Kirkpatrick, the Executive Director-Comptroller, under the chairmanship of [] 25X1A9A. The new ADPC was to pull together information on existing and future ADP interest in each Directorate.

In July 1965 the Phase III effort on CHIVE was organized as the CHIVE Task Force (CTF), drawing on personnel from both 25X1A9A CR and OCS. [redacted] chief of the OCS Development Division, was designated Director/CTF, to report to the D/CR. 25X1A9A [redacted], in addition to his other duties, continued to act as CHIVE Project Officer, relating design activities to other Agency components and obtaining advice and assistance from them as required. System analysis [redacted] 25X1A9A [redacted] was the senior OCR officer under [redacted] well as Chief of the Requirements and Plans Group within the CTF.

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

114

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

The CTF consisted of the entire OCS Development Division (on detail), the OCR SAS, the embryonic CHIVE China Operations Group (COG), ² ~~the~~ machine² assisted translation ~~grom~~ project for FDD known as ALP (see FDD History for details), and a cadre to provide continuity in various procedural, file-building, selection, indexing and other tasks as CHIVE evolved from the initial China test group ~~(to)~~ other geographic areas. OCR's initial contribution to the personnel of the CTF was to be 54 slots of a total of 75. The office attempted to obtain new positions, but EPAM denied the request¹ and various other OCR activities had to be reduced or eliminated in order to continue~~at~~ with CHIVE development.

During August and September 1965 OCR conducted an intensive review of all its operations in an effort to identify those that might be curtailed or eliminated to meet the high ^{priority} CHIVE requirement. Wherever possible, they took those positions, and employees, whose ^{activities} ~~activities~~ were closely related to ~~CHIVE~~ CHIVE and who would expect to be associated with the program in the normal course of events. In other cases, they had to levy against other components, such as FDD, whose relationship to CHIVE was remote. In the latter instances, the ceiling ~~positions were~~ allocated to CHIVE, but the employees concerned had to be accommodated within the reduced T/O of the parent group. Through this process, OCR managed to identify the necessary 54 positions.

Staffing for Phase III began in earnest with the

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

1/5

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

publication on 13 October of CR 65-3, which explained what positions were ~~what~~ available and urged OCR employees with a genuine interest in such assignment to apply for positions on the CHIVE Task Force.

The objective of CHIVE Phase III was the creation of the initial element of OCR to perform as an all-source, machine-supported unit having certain capabilities. This initial element, the COG, was to operate in Phase IV in parallel with existing OCR Communist China activities, the parallelism reflecting an insurance principle and not a black-or-white ~~situation~~ condition. ~~Phase III was to be considered terminated when the COG was established.~~

The target date for completing Phase III was ¹April 1967. This phase was to be considered ended when the D/CTF had carried out a demonstration of system capabilities that would assure the D/CR that:

1. The COG was adequately manned and trained to carry out its functions.
2. The necessary computer programs to support these functions had been developed and tested.
3. A complete set of procedures for the COG and its interactions with the other components of OCR had been specified and tested.
4. An acceptable level of competence had been achieved in indexing, file maintenance and retrieval service.
5. Adequate methods had been designed and implemented to gather management data, including economic parameters, during Phase IV.

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

116

to determine the feasibility of converting its EAM-based system to an EDP system. The study, which evaluated costs, effectiveness, benefits, timing, and personnel and training requirements, was spearheaded by [] assisted by knowledgeable officials from OCS and IBM, as well as by several other OCR representatives.

25X1A9A

On the basis of the conclusions of the feasibility study and consideration of various alternatives, the D/CR on 1 November requested authorization from the DDI to proceed with the immediate acquisition of an IBM 360/30 then about to be released by OCS. This was to be a limited ~~maximum~~ and relatively simple computer installation to meet the file manipulation needs of OCR's existing system. It in no way duplicated or replaced the CHIVE effort, which was to be driven by the OCS large-scale computer complex.

Some of the basic points of the feasibility study were that:

1. Installation of the EDP equipment would afford qualitative improvement in OCR's management of its massive punch card files in terms of currency of input and completeness and timeliness of response.
2. A cost trade off with the EAM equipment could be achieved within 12-16 months. Additional modest expenses accruing during

SECRET*No Foreign Dissem*

123

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

this period could be paid for within the OCR budget. No increase of manpower would be required.

3. There would be no degradation of the CHIVE effort, and in fact, the acquisition of this gear would allow CHIVE debugging to proceed rapidly while offering relief to OCS of its 360/65 computer.
4. A machine system to handle the massive inherited files of OCR must be maintained for some years to come even assuming the success of CHIVE because the cost of conversion of these old files to the CHIVE system was impractical and too costly.
5. The equipment could be accommodated within OCR space with a modest investment of about \$2,000.
6. There would be no serious interruption of the level of OCR retrieval service during the transition.
7. No personnel problems would be created, and in fact, ~~existing attrition problems~~ ^{caused by} ~~would be alleviated.~~ Machine personnel no longer ~~wished~~ ^{wish} to remain associated with an EAM setup in the age of computers, ⁱⁿ ~~would be alleviated.~~
8. OCR personnel would acquire training in the use of EDP equipment and would ~~then~~ ^{be} become employable in the CHIVE and other computer operations of the Agency.

The DDI's office found the logic of OCR's arguments for the acquisition of the computer persuasive and decided to approve it, feeling that the benefits to be derived far outweighed the small additional cost involved.

CHIVE--COG

25X1A9A

Effective 7 November was appointed Chief,

&

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

124

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

25X1A9A

China Operations Group, CHIVE Task Force. brought
19 years of intelligence production and managerial experience
to his new post. He had most recently served since 1962 as
Director, National Indications Center.

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~
Facsimile Transmission Study

With the move of CIA to Langley pending within the year, CODIB decided that it was both necessary and desirable to make plans for the rapid transmission of documentary materials among the respective headquarters of its members. To develop the requirements for such a system and to examine ~~the~~ the various media that could be used, they established a Working Group on Facsimile Transmission, at OCR suggestion. [] Chief of the ADG, was named to head the working group.

25X1A9A

More on

Facsimile ~~Trans~~ Transmission

In February the CODIB Working Group on Facsimile Transmission Service concluded that interagency facsimile service was not justified at that time because the problem of secure transmission had not been resolved, because of the cost, and, principally, because the existing courier system would suffice. The group then disbanded. (OCR would later take up study of this problem on its own.)

~~More on MTR~~

~~At 10~~

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

70

Facsimile Transmission Again

Inasmuch as the CODIB Working Group on Facsimile Transmission had reached a negative conclusion in 1961, OCR decided to move ahead on its own. On 3 July 1962 it submitted to the DDS specifications for a communications system designed to handle the transmission of information in documents between OCR and other government agencies, primarily the State Department.

Mr. Borel noted that he had recently found that the Xerox ~~xx~~
No Foreign Dissem

83

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

Corporation had a capability to meet at least part of the requirement and was interest^{ed} in pursuing the matter further with appropriate Agency personnel. Various systems were examined over the next 2 years; eventually the Long Distance Xerox (LDX) system was chosen as meeting most of the requirements.

Facsimile LDX

OCR's pushing of developments for a secure facsimile transmission system resulted in FY 1964 in the funding of a research and development effort in this area by the Office of Communications. Preliminary machine testing of the LDX system was undertaken between DD and BR in June 1964. An initial project for transmission between ^{The} DDI and State Operations Centers was projected.

LDX Circuit

Effective 29 April an LDX circuit between the CIA headquarters building and NPIC became operative. This channel was a high-speed, secure, facsimile transmission system that linked the two bodies together. The headquarters building terminal was located in OCR/SR, which was responsible for the record keeping, including maintenance of incoming and ~~out~~going logs and assigning and controlling of message numbers. SR was also responsible for notifying individuals who had received LDX messages and for delivering LDX messages to senior officials within the headquarters building. The LDX circuit was not to replace normal dissemination channels but to provide a rapid means for transmitting critical nonrecord and advance copies of ~~messages~~ ^{messages}, intelligence documents, memorandums, and other materials at all levels of security classification when it was determined that courier or teletype transmissions would not suffice. It was to be used especially as a means for coordinating and reviewing all available information in fast-moving, critical situations.

~~In May 1961 Ellis was appointed Director, CTF, vice~~
~~M. J. M. who was reassigned.~~